The Morality and Ethics of UAS in Combat

The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in armed combat has become a much discussed moral and ethical issue largely since the first armed drone strike in 2001 by an armed Predator in Afghanistan (Weinberger, 2014).  Use of UAS as strike vehicles, particularly by the US military and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has increased significantly since that first strike with an estimated 3,300 combatant deaths attributed to UAS strikes (Byman, 2013).  Regardless of the strike vehicle, manned aircraft (MA) or UAS, according to Air Force officials the decision process for the kill - no kill decision is the same (Greenberg, 2008).  UAS have several advantages over manned aircraft (MA) in the prosecution of precision air strikes, the most obvious being the lack of risk of casualty to the pilot and aircrews.  It is this factor that has led to much debate with regards to the use of UAS in the application of lethal force.

Technical Advantages UAS versus MA

A key tactical advantage offered by UAS is the significant loiter times which far exceed that of manned strike aircraft.  For example, an MQ-9 Reaper has a range without refueling of 1000 nautical miles (USAF, 2010) and a flight duration of approximately 27 hours (General Atomics, 2015) as opposed to an F-16, which without refueling, has a combat radius of approximately 500 miles (Global Security, 2015).  Extended flight durations and loiter times allow for long term monitoring of possible targets to ensure fidelity in target assignment as well as the capability to safely remain on station after the strike to perform after action battle damage assessments and continued intelligence gathering. 

Human factors 

Fuel loads and aircraft capability aside, the extended flight duration capability is not available with smaller fighter and attack aircraft (tactical) simply due to human operator flight hour limitations of 12 hours (U.S.A.F., 2014).  On the other hand, through the use of crew changes and shift work, UAS operations can utilize the full extent of the extended operating durations.  The implementation of shift work in combat UAS operations has driven new research into the fatigue and stress factors associated with long term UAS combat operations. 

High levels of fatigue and stress can lead to poor decision making and numerous other psychological problems as well as manifestation of physical ailments such as high blood pressure and headaches (Mayo Clinic, 2013).  Research has indicated that UAS crews may possibly experience greater levels of fatigue due to longer missions and the inherent negative physiological effects of shift work (Tvaryanas & MacPherson, 2009) and are also vulnerable to the effects of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and moral injury (Mathews, 2014).  Earlier psychological theory had held that PTSD could only be experienced by those directly exposed to physical threat as opposed to the indirect exposure typical of UAS operations (Mathews, 2014).  Research would indicate the idea of “antiseptic feel” as opined by Carter (2013, video, 30 sec) appears contrary to the psychological impact of combat strikes to UAS operators, who by virtue of their witnessing the human impact of their actions due to after action loitering may develop existential neurosis leading in some case to suicide (Mathews, 2014).

Ethics and Morality

Rules of engagement

Rules of engagement imposed upon those in harm's way further the justification for use of unmanned aircraft on the battlefield.  Under part of the rules of engagement agreed to between US Secretary of State Kerry and then Afghan President Hamid Karzai, U.S troops in Afghanistan cannot engage an enemy without first confirming with certainty that the enemy is armed even when the target has been already confirmed as being the enemy; additionally, except under extremely limited circumstances American troops may not enter an Afghan home (Scarborough, 2013).  Under this policy it is theoretically possible for an armed insurgent to enter a home and be excluded from attack unless the insurgent fires from the home, and even then there are limitations. 

Existing policy is perceived by some as restrictive and a causal factor in numerous battlefield deaths.  As revealed in an investigative file concerning the downing of an American CH-47 helicopter that resulted in the death of 30 American service-members, this belief was testified to by an Apache gunship pilot and an AC-130 gunship navigator (Scarborough, 2013).  The Apache pilot after seeing the location from which an insurgent had just fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) that struck the American CH-47 helicopter (killing all 30 aboard) stated the rules of engagement prohibited the him from firing directly at the enemy, “Due to [rules of engagement] and tactical directives, I couldn’t fire at the building where I thought the [shooter] was, so I aimed directly to the west of the building,” (p. 1).  In the same battle preceding the loss of the CH-47, an AC-130 gunship was denied permission to fire at a known enemy location,  “There were several opportunities where we could have engaged with 40 mm ensuring zero [collateral damage estimate] on any buildings, the opportunity was definitely there for us to engage those two guys or even provide containment fires to try to slow their movement” (p.1.).

These rules create an additional need to develop tactical methodology to engage the enemy while decreasing troop exposure; UAS are just such a method.  Additionally, UAS strike operations have the ability to follow rules of engagement without endangering a soldier or airman’s life.  According to Dr. Stephen Carter, Yale Law School Professor, the current administration believes that UAS are ideally suited to this in that they are highly accurate and able to “discriminate perfectly”  (Carter, 2013, video, 2:17 sec), an assertion he does not dispute.  

Discrimination

The principal in the just conduct in war that bears relevance in this review is that of discrimination.  Discrimination as applied to war fighting is simply the concept of target discrimination, in other words, who is a target and who is not, some may look at this as discriminating between combatants and non-combatants.  (Moseley, n.d.).  Whether one agrees or disagrees with this concept is beyond the scope of this document however, the use of UAS for precision strikes neatly satisfies the requirement of discrimination within the concept of UAS strike operations. 

Over the course of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) some reports indicate that UAS have consistently killed less non-combatant than their manned counterparts (Saletan, 2013).  Over a period of six years, from 2006 through 2012, several agencies have calculated the percentage of civilian death as opposed to al-Quaida and Taliban deaths in Pakistan as a result of UAS strikes.  Figures ranged from a low of six percent to a high of 22 to 35 percent; compare this to the death rates of civilians in previous conflicts, most directly comparable (due to the air strike factor only with no ground troops in the calculations) the NATO bombing campaign in Serbia, 83 percent (Saletan, 2013).  Although there are opposing viewpoints and exact figures are extremely difficult to ascertain due to different methodologies, military and CIA secrecy requirements, and the integrity or political agendas of the reporting agency, research does support that UAS strikes are capable of inflicting less collateral damage than MA strikes.  Walsh, after reviewing numerous data sources comes to the conclusion that civilian deaths attributable to drone strikes are typically similar or in most accounts lower than civilian deaths from other methods (Walsh, 2013).

Continued development

            UAS development continues at a rapid pace with new UAS such as the shipboard capable X-47, the ultra high altitude RQ-180, and the mach 6 capable SR-72 as prime examples of cutting edge UAS development (Weinberger, 2014).  Specifically related to precision strikes, improvements in imaging systems will continue to improve the utility and accuracy of UAS in strike roles.  The ARGUS-IS 1.8 gigapixel resolution imaging system designed for UAS operations is reportedly capable of taking images as small as 15 centimeters from an altitude of 6 kilometers (Military.com, 2013).  This type of high-level resolution enables decision makers and intelligence personnel to have greater clarity of the action on the ground and be more accurate in assessments that preface kill – no kill decisions.

The ability to operate long endurance, strike capable UAS from aircraft carriers is another development that will provide flexibility for battlefield commanders and strategic planners.  Eliminating the need to operate from foreign soil via ship based air operations has long been a successful strategy of the United States in the manned aircraft environment and will likely be so in the unmanned environment.  One such aircraft currently under development that is designed to be capable operating form an aircraft carrier is the X-47 (Weinberger, 2014). 

Lastly, continued debate, both nationally and internationally, on the rules of war and the lethal use of UAS can serve only to heighten the populace’s level of awareness of the issue and enable policy makers at all levels to determine policies and rules that, if not satisfy, at least recognize the concerns of the citizenship.

References

Byman, D.  (2013).  Why drones work.  Foreign Affairs.  Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/somalia/2013-06-11/why-drones-work

Carter, S.  (2013, Mar 26).  Drone ethics: Stephen Carter extended interview.  Video.  Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kUB3PSOYGsc

General Atomics  (2015).  MQ-9 Reaper/Predator B.  Retrieved from http://www.ga-asi.com/Websites/gaasi/images/products/aircraft_systems/pdf/MQ9%20Reaper_Predator_B_032515.pdf

Global Security  (2015, May 13).  F-16 Fighting Falcon.  Retrieved from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/aircraft/f-16.htm

Greenberg, A.  (2008, May 30).  War without soldiers.  Forbes.  Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/2008/05/30/military-robots-technology-tech-security-cx_ag_0530robots.html

Mathews, M.  (2014).  Special: Stress among UAV operators – Posttraumatic stress disorder, existential crisis, or moral injury.  Ethics and Armed Forces.  Retrieved from http://www.ethikundmilitaer.de/fileadmin/Journale/2014-06_English/Special_-_Stress_among_UAV_Operators_-_Posttraumatic_Stress_Disorder__Existential_Crisis__or_Moral_Injury_-_Michael_D._Matthews.pdf

Mayo Clinic  (2013, July 19).  Stress symptoms: effects on your body and behavior.  Retrieved from http://www.mayoclinic.org/healthy-lifestyle/stress-management/in-depth/stress-symptoms/art-20050987

Military.com (2013, February 20).  Super high-def camera for drones.  Retrieved from

http://www.military.com/video/aircraft/pilotless-aircraft/high-def-super-camera-for-drones/2178464877001/

Moseley, A.  (n.d.)  Just War theory.  Internet encyclopedia of philosophy.  Retrieved from http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwar/

Saletan, W.  (2013, March 13).  In defense of drones.  Slate.  Retrieved from

http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/drones_war_and_civilian_casualties_how_unmanned_aircraft_reduce_collateral.html

Scarborough, R.  (2013, November 26).  Rules of engagement limit the actions of U.S. troops and drones in Afghanistan.  The Washington Times.  Retrieved from

http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/26/rules-of-engagement-bind-us-troops-actions-in-afgh/?page=all

Tvaryanas, A., MacPherson, G.  (2009).  Fatigue in pilots of remotely piloted aircraft before and after shift work adjustment.  Retrieved from http://www.wpafb.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090611-105.pdf

U.S.A.F  (2010, August 18).  MQ-9 Reaper.  Retrieved from http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper.aspx

U.S.A.F.  (2014, November 7).  Air Force Instruction 11-2-2, volume 3.  Retrieved from http://static.e-publishing.af.mil/production/1/af_a3_5/publication/afi11-202v3/afi11-202v3.pdf

Walsh, J.  (2013, September).  The effectiveness of drone strikes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism campaigns.  Retrieved from

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1167.pdf

Weinberger, S.  (2014, May 17).  The ultra-lethal drones of the future.  The New York Post.  Retrieved from http://nypost.com/2014/05/17/evolution-of-the-drone/