ASCI 638 Assignment 4.5 BLOS

                                          

The Kaman K-MAX Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) is capable of autonomous beyond line of site (BLOS) operation both day and night (Kaman Aerospace, n.d.).  Its’ primary mission forth the US military is autonomous resupply in both hostile and non-hostile environments and the unit can also be configured for a variety of non-military uses including fire fighting, logging, humanitarian resupply and construction support (Lockheed Martin, n.d.).  The K-MAX is a joint venture between Kaman Aerospace, manufacturer of the original manned K-Max heavy lift helicopter, and Lockheed Martin which provided the mission integration, on-board intelligence and command and control technology (Kaman, n.d.).  Possessing a maximum external load capacity of 6,855 lbs and a an external payload hook capacity of 6000 lbs, the UAS has a range of 396.3 km with load and 494.5 km without load (Kaman, n.d.).  The system is operated via a ruggedized lap top computer which serves as the ground control station (GCS) and utilizes a portable antennae for line of sight (LOS) operations while BLOS operations utilize a satellite based data link (Kaman, n.d.)  No additional personnel or equipment are required to convert from LOS to BLOS operations.  Each controller can command two K-MAX.  Additionally, the UAS is fitted with high-resolution video and 3D imaging to allow for precision terrain avoidance and safe landing in challenging terrain (Lockheed Martin, n.d.).  The entire mission can be flown in a fully autonomous mode with mission plans pre-loaded and capable of being altered or changed mid flight by the controller or autonomously if an obstacle is detected; if desired another ground controller can take control of the aircraft for precision landings at the drop site, though his is not necessary and is strictly optional.

BLOS operation has the obvious advantage of increasing available range and enabling day or night operations in varying terrain.  Threat avoidance is significantly enhanced by the systems ability to operate at night and with a low noise signature provided by the twin counter-rotating intermeshing rotors and tail-rotor less design.  Provided the technology and systems are operating correctly there are no disadvantages to BLOS operations.  The design maintains the original K-MAX’s single seat cockpit for flight in an optionally piloted configuration and dual flight control computers provide redundancy and additional reliability (Kaman, n.d.). 

There are numerous opportunities for commercial BLOS UAS operations.  In a study focused primarily on agriculture, forestry and energy sectors a report by Andrew Shelley Economic Consulting and Aviation Safety Management Systems presented to the government of New Zealand estimated that allowing BLOS operations could provide up to NZ$190 million in economic benefits (Friday Offcuts, 2015). Currently France has allowed one company, Delair-Tech, to certify and operate a BLOS UAS, the DT-18 UAV for BLOS operation in France (Amato, 2014).  The American distributor for Delair, Fly Terra, has been testing the DT-18 in New York at the DUAIR test facility.

Another opportunity for BLOS UAS is small package delivery.  UAS package delivery, being championed by companies such as Amazon (King, 2015) would require BLOS capability to be useable in a commercial environment.  Maintaining LOS operations only for a delivery service is simply not practical. While some argue that small package delivery via UAS is simply not practical or realistic due to fundamental logistics issues (Wohlsen, 2014) package delivery has been tested in certain markets overseas such as India, which has less restrictive UAS rules than the US (King, 2015) and Canada, which in 2014 approved over 1600 companies for commercial UAS operations (Etherington, 2015).  In 2014 DHL announced that it would begin autonomous, monitored BLOS delivery services to the small island of Juist in the North Sea, upon arriving at designated landing point a DHL driver will make the last leg of the delivery by truck (Hern, 2014).  Ultimately, based on current trials and logistics fundamentals, it would appear that BLOS capability and operation is a necessity for successful commercial UAS package delivery operations.

References

Amato, A.  (2014).  Bring me that horizon: Delair-Tech and Beyond-Lin-of-Sight.  DroneLife.com.  Retrieved from

http://dronelife.com/2014/07/25/delair-tech-beyond-line-of-sight/

Etherington, D.  (2015).  Canada Proves Fertile Ground For Amazon Drone Delivery Tests.  Techcrunch.  Retrieved from

http://techcrunch.com/2015/03/30/canada-proves-fertile-ground-for-amazon-drone-delivery-tests/

Friday Offcuts.  (2015, March 13).  NZ$190M/year by allowing beyond-line-of-sight drones.  Retrieved from

http://www.fridayoffcuts.com/index.cfm?id=616#2

Hern, A.  (2014, Sep 25).  DHL launches first commercial drone 'parcelcopter' delivery service.  The Guardian.  Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/sep/25/german-dhl-launches-first-commercial-drone-delivery-service

Kaman Aerospace.  (n.d.).  The K-MAX® Unmanned Aircraft System – A Power Lifter Transformed.  Retrieved from

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed/data/ms2/documents/K-MAX-brochure.pdf

King, H.  (2015, March 20).  FAA allows Amazon to test drones in U.S.  CNN.  Retrieved from http://money.cnn.com/2015/03/19/technology/faa-amazon-drones/index.html

Lockheed Martin.  (n.d.).  The evolution of the K-MAX Cargo UAS technology.  Retrieved from

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/us/products/kmax/cargo-uas-technology.html

Wohlsen, M. (2013, December 2).  Even if the Feds Let Them Fly, Amazon’s Delivery Drones Are Still Nonsense.  Wired.  Retrieved from http://www.wired.com/2013/12/amazon-drone/

ASCI 638 Assignment 3.4

The primary goal of NextGen can be summed up simply as modernization of the National Air Space (NAS) (FAA, n.d.).  Being more specific, the goals are enhanced safety, reduced airspace and terminal congestion, reduced environmental impact, and improved tower to cockpit communications.  The use of satellite weather monitoring in conjunction with advanced radar and satellite based aircraft monitoring allows for more efficient routing with each aircraft receiving an individualized route as opposed to a standard route.  This affects all phases of flight particularly approach, where the aircraft will be vectored on final with a continuous descent profile thereby saving fuel though the avoidance of stepped transitions as well as eliminating or at least minimizing time in pattern.  An additional benefit is reduced noise pollution and exhaust emissions for communities adjacent to the airport.  Metered pushbacks as opposed to the current system of first come, first served serves to minimize taxi time and taxiway congestion, also reducing fuel consumption and positively impacting the environment through the reduction of hydrocarbons (FAA, n.d.). 

One of the key integration factors of UAS operating in the NAS is sense and avoid capability.  The lack of an on-board pilot, while creating numerous design and capability benefits, creates the single biggest hurdle to an effective sense and avoid capability and presents a credible safety concern for UAS operating in the NAS.  se and avoid technology is developing rapidly and according to the Air Force’s sense and avoid program manager the biggest hurdle is not technological, it is FAA policy (Insinna, 2014).  The sense and avoid technology needed varies with the type of aircraft and its’ operating environment, for example, small UAS operating strictly in line of sight can effectively rely on the pilot or operator (Yamaha 2013), smaller UAS, such as the Raven, may eventually utilize a system incorporating on-board sensors combined with ground based radar,  while the most promising combination for larger UAS, such as the Global Hawk, will likely rely on a system integrating traffic collision avoidance system (T-CAS), automatic dependent  surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B), radar, and light detection and ranging (LIDAR) (Insinna, 2014).  All of which are mature or maturing technologies.

Another significant safety concern is that of a lost link scenario, that is a scenario where a UAS loses the control link with the ground control station (GCS) and subsequently the aircraft pilot or operator.  This can be caused by a variety of factors ranging from terrain or weather interference, to mechanical failure, or in worst-case scenarios, purposeful hacking (Paganini, 2013).  Larger or more advanced military UAS such as the RQ-170 utilize sophisticated lost link protocols.  Upon detecting a lost link scenario, the RQ-170 is designed to autonomously follow a pre-established profile until contact is reestablished, due to its’ highly classified nature, the RQ-170 is also equipped with a self-destruct feature (Carr, 2011).  Other less sophisticated UAS , such as the Yamaha RMAX utilize a simple hover and land protocol (Hanlon, 2004).  In any event, lost link protocols will need to be tailored to the specific UAS’ operating parameters and  prevailing FAA requirements.  Just as with sense and avoid technology there is no one size fits all answer.

A significant human factor consideration is loss of a direct pilot, tower verbal interface.  Traditional air traffic control methodologies rely on extensive verbal communication between the tower and pilot and much of this interface is either not needed or not practical with UAS.  NextGen begins part of the transition with  datacom protocols using digital messages instead of voice to transmit electronically much of the data and instructions that were previously communicated via voice (FAA, n.d.).  MITRE Corporation’s UAS sense and avoid technology, which sends a synthesized voice message to air traffic controllers in the event of a lost link scenario, though experimental, is receiving much attention (Van Cleave, 2011) and also lends an human, albeit artificial, touch to what would otherwise be a sterile electronic environment. 

Integration of UAS into the NAS concurrent with the introduction of NextGen will change the NAS forever and the successful combination appears to be gravitating towards a mixture of electronic and human elements.

ASCI 638 Assignment 2-5

The Predator Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) in various series and configurations has been in operation since 1994, (General Atomics, n.d.a).  Depending upon configuration and series the Predator can be used in armed and unarmed roles for missions ranging from Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) to a variety of strike missions (General Atomics, n.d.b.).  Depending upon series and configuration the Predator has a maximum operating altitude of up to 50,000 feet, Predator B, or 25,000 feet, Predator (Airforce-technology.com, n.d.). 

The ground control station for the Predator is located in a 30 foot long commercial style trailer housing pilot and payload operator seating positions and relies on external power for electrical support,  each GCS controls 1 Predator aircraft (FAS, 1997).  The latest versions of the GCS are equipped with 3 Boeing data and mission consoles as well as various radar and sensor terminals (Airforce-technology.com, n.d.).  This configuration has led to one of the primary ergonomic/human factors complaints of the system and that is one of too many screens in what amounts to a frustratingly non-ergonomic collection of screens and controls which can potentially contribute to pilot error induced crashes (Freedburg, 2012). 

The U.S Air Force and the U.S. Army are testing a possible and potentially promising solution, the General Atomics Aeronautical Systems (GA-ASI) Advanced Cockpit Ground Control Station (GCS).  The open architecture design allows for possible use with other maker’s UAS as well a variety of models and series of its’ own manufacture (UAS Vision, 2013).  The GCS under testing serves to mitigate the screen dilemma through the use of wrap–around style display screens as well as various other ergonomic and functional improvements such as an integrated moving display map and integrated digital checklists (UAS Vision, 2013).  The wrap-around screens effectively give the impression of an actual cockpit view and combine displays from a multitude of sensors and control commands into a more efficient layout that provides a reduced pilot workload (UAS Vision, 2013). 

A second ergonomic flaw, and one which was a contributory factor in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 2006 crash of a Predator B in Nogales, Arizona, is the existing design of the Predator throttle quadrant as related to its’ configuration for use by a sensor operator and pilot (Carrigan, et al, 2008).  The dual consoles, one for the sensor operator (PPO-2) and one for the pilot (PPO-1) have identical throttle quadrants and layouts allowing for ease of convertibility of stations. 

When used by PPO-1 the throttle quadrant functions in a fairly traditional mannerwith the condition lever being a critical factor in this incident (Carrigan, et al, 2008).  In PPO-1 operation moving the condition lever forward allows fuel flow to the engine, the middle position cuts fuel and shuts the engine off and the rear position feathers the propeller.  In PPO-2 operation the condition lever controls camera iris opening positions.  As described by Carrigan (2008), switching PPO-1 and PPO-2 positions requires the use of a checklist and dictates the PPO-2 quadrant be configured to the same settings as the PPO-1 quadrant prior to changeover.  There is no lockout or warning to prevent changeover without completing the checklist or confirming quadrant settings.  In the 2006 Nogales accident the PPO-2 quadrant settings were not configured to the PPO-1 settings prior to changeover, this along with other contributing factors led to loss of control of the aircraft and the resulting crash (NTSB, 2014).  The NTSB ultimately determined the primary cause of the crash to be the pilot’s failure to use the required checklist when switching operational control from the PPO-1 position to the PPO-2 position (NTSB, 2014).  

Though the NTSB determined this to be pilot error, the human factor failure in the design of the system cannot be overlooked.  A simple electronic interlock that prevents switchover without the 2 quadrants being in the same position would have prevented this loss of aircraft.  Additionally, electronic checklists that populate on one of the multiple control screens can be implemented which will serve as a fail-safe reminder.  This change has in fact has been incorporated in the GA-ASI Advanced Cockpit GCS currently undergoing testing with the U.S Air Force and U.S Army (UAS Vision, 2013).

Information overload and multiple displays were and continue to be a factor in aircraft design.  The UAS industry’s current experience is similar to the transition the manned aircraft industry experienced with the introduction of “glass cockpits” and ever increasing automation.  Though initially met with mixed results the transition has been generally well accepted (Weiner, 1989) and has resulted significant improvements to aircraft safety and operability (Prinzel, 2004).

References

Airforce-technology.com.  (n.d.).  Predator RQ-1 / MQ-1 / MQ-9 Reaper UAV, United States of America.

http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/predator-uav/

FAS.  (1997).  UAV Ground Control Station (GCS).  Retrieved from

http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_gcs.htm

Carrigan, G., Long, D., Cummings, M., Duffner J.  (2008).  MIT Humans and Automation Lab.  Human Factors Analysis of Predator B Crash.  Retrieved from  http://web.mit.edu/aeroastro/labs/halab/papers/Carrigan_AUVSI.pdf

FAS.  (n.d.).  UAV Ground Control Station (GCS).  Retrieved from http://fas.org/irp/program/collect/uav_gcs.htm

Freedburg, S.  (2012).  Breaking Defense.  Too Many Screens: Why Drones Are So Hard To Fly, So Easy To Crash.  Retrieved from

http://breakingdefense.com/2012/08/too-many-screens-why-drones-are-so-hard-to-fly-and-so-easy/

General Atomics.  (n.d.a.).  Predator UAS.  Retrieved from

http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator.php

General Atomics.  (n.d.b.).  Predator B UAS.  Retrieved from http://www.ga-asi.com/products/aircraft/predator_b.php

NTSB.  (2007).  Aviation Accident Database and Synopses.  CHI06MA121.  Retrieved from http://www.ntsb.gov/_layouts/ntsb.aviation/index.aspx

Prinzel, L., Risser, M.  (2004).  NASA/TM-2004-213000 (corrected copy).   Head-Up Displays and Attention Capture.  Retrieved from  http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?

UAS Vision.  (April 25, 2013).  General Atomics Next-Generation GCS Successfully Integrates Flagship and Advanced Predator Platforms.  Retrieved from  http://www.uasvision.com/2013/04/25/general-atomics-next-generation

Case analysis effectiveness and applicability

In the final blog for this class we were tasked with discussing case analysis as an educational tool and also relevance to real world situations. I found the use of case studies in this course to be an effective tool that was extremely helpful, particularly given my admittedly limited knowledge of the subject (though I certainly know more now than when I started). Refining the focus of study on the issue being reviewed allows for a more detailed perspective.  UAS study is a very broad and continually evolving area so being able to narrow research to specific instances and delve into the details of those instances was helpful in achieving meaningful results in the necessarily restricted time frame of an academic calendar.  Being an on-line class with limited student interaction, the process allowed for sharing and considering different perspectives both subjective and objective.  The end result is a better product.

Case studies, though prevalent in psychology and other medical disciplines  (McLeod, 2008) have applicability in a wide variety of business settings.  From a past business perspective I used a case study method to determine the economic and operational viability of a proposed commercial delivery route.  I was interested in expanding our area of service on our Western Washington based organic delivery fleet into Eastern Washington and Western Idaho, vice using contracted delivery services that had been the norm after the closure of our Eastern Washington distribution facility. Eastern and Western Washington are separated by several mountain passes which routinely are closed or limited during the winter season and, given the distances involved, DOT hours of service rules (FMCSA, n.d.) typically make same day service out of Western Washington not feasible. The case study approach, researching both previous in-house efforts as well as those of competitors, allowed for an informed decision making process at my level and aided in presentation to upper management that subsequently resulted in approval of a trial period.  Upper management, based largely on anecdotal information, had previously been very hesitant about implementing the change.  The routes did hold true to the research conclusions and remained in effect with updates and modifications as needed based on business conditions throughout my tenure at the company.

            Case studies are not always feasible or the best approach.  In another situation I was tasked with completely revamping hours of operation to coincide with the activation of a new rail carrier agreement which when implemented would result in extensive service failures under then current operating hours.  The rail agreement was (figuratively) written in stone without field input and very little reaction time was permitted.  A sink or swim scenario.  A case study approach was not suitable as there was no history of similar operations anywhere in the corporation and competitor information was not relevant due to different service parameters that were considered unacceptable.  In this case, a hazard and operability (HAZOP) type of review (Goetsch, 2011) was conducted.  Though HAZOP is directed towards safety, from an operations perspective the fundamental process was similar and applicable and aided in determining specific hours, tasking, and staffing necessary to meet performance goals.

References

Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration.  (n.d.).  Hours of Service.  Retrieved from

            http://www.fmcsa.dot.gov/regulations/hours-of-service       

Goetsch, D. L.  (2011).  Occupational Safety and Health for Technologists, Engineers,

           and Managers (7^th ed.).  Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

McLeod, S. A. (2008). Case Study Method. Retrieved from

            http://www.simplypsychology.org/case-study.html