The Morality and Ethics of
UAS in Combat
The use of unmanned aircraft
systems (UAS) in armed combat has become a much discussed moral and ethical
issue largely since the first armed drone strike in 2001 by an armed Predator
in Afghanistan (Weinberger, 2014). Use
of UAS as strike vehicles, particularly by the US military and the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), has increased significantly since that first strike with an
estimated 3,300 combatant deaths attributed to UAS strikes (Byman, 2013). Regardless of the strike vehicle, manned
aircraft (MA) or UAS, according to Air Force officials the decision process for
the kill - no kill decision is the same (Greenberg, 2008). UAS have several advantages over manned
aircraft (MA) in the prosecution of precision air strikes, the most obvious
being the lack of risk of casualty to the pilot and aircrews. It is this factor that has led to much debate
with regards to the use of UAS in the application of lethal force.
Technical
Advantages UAS versus MA
A key tactical advantage offered
by UAS is the significant loiter times which far exceed that of manned strike
aircraft. For example, an MQ-9 Reaper
has a range without refueling of 1000 nautical miles (USAF, 2010) and a flight
duration of approximately 27 hours (General Atomics, 2015) as opposed to an
F-16, which without refueling, has a combat radius of approximately 500 miles (Global
Security, 2015). Extended flight
durations and loiter times allow for long term monitoring of possible targets
to ensure fidelity in target assignment as well as the capability to safely remain
on station after the strike to perform after action battle damage assessments
and continued intelligence gathering.
Human factors
Fuel loads and aircraft
capability aside, the extended flight duration capability is not available with
smaller fighter and attack aircraft (tactical) simply due to human operator flight
hour limitations of 12 hours (U.S.A.F., 2014). On the other hand, through the use of crew
changes and shift work, UAS operations can utilize the full extent of the
extended operating durations. The
implementation of shift work in combat UAS operations has driven new research into
the fatigue and stress factors associated with long term UAS combat
operations.
High levels of fatigue and
stress can lead to poor decision making and numerous other psychological
problems as well as manifestation of physical ailments such as high blood
pressure and headaches (Mayo Clinic, 2013).
Research has indicated that UAS crews may possibly experience greater
levels of fatigue due to longer missions and the inherent negative
physiological effects of shift work (Tvaryanas & MacPherson, 2009) and are
also vulnerable to the effects of post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and
moral injury (Mathews, 2014). Earlier
psychological theory had held that PTSD could only be experienced by those
directly exposed to physical threat as opposed to the indirect exposure typical
of UAS operations (Mathews, 2014).
Research would indicate the idea of “antiseptic feel” as opined by
Carter (2013, video, 30 sec) appears contrary to the psychological impact of
combat strikes to UAS operators, who by virtue of their witnessing the human
impact of their actions due to after action loitering may develop existential
neurosis leading in some case to suicide (Mathews, 2014).
Ethics
and Morality
Rules of engagement
Rules of engagement imposed
upon those in harm's way further the justification for use of unmanned aircraft
on the battlefield. Under part of the rules
of engagement agreed to between US Secretary of State Kerry and then Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, U.S troops in Afghanistan cannot engage an enemy without first confirming
with certainty that the enemy is armed even when the target has been already confirmed
as being the enemy; additionally, except under extremely limited circumstances American
troops may not enter an Afghan home (Scarborough, 2013). Under this policy it is theoretically
possible for an armed insurgent to enter a home and be excluded from attack
unless the insurgent fires from the home, and even then there are
limitations.
Existing policy is perceived
by some as restrictive and a causal factor in numerous battlefield deaths. As revealed in an investigative file
concerning the downing of an American CH-47 helicopter that resulted in the
death of 30 American service-members, this belief was testified to by an Apache
gunship pilot and an AC-130 gunship navigator (Scarborough, 2013). The Apache pilot after seeing the location
from which an insurgent had just fired a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) that
struck the American CH-47 helicopter (killing all 30 aboard) stated the rules of
engagement prohibited the him from firing directly at the enemy, “Due to [rules
of engagement] and tactical directives, I couldn’t fire at the building where I
thought the [shooter] was, so I aimed directly to the west of the building,” (p.
1). In the same battle preceding the
loss of the CH-47, an AC-130 gunship was denied permission to fire at a known
enemy location, “There were several
opportunities where we could have engaged with 40 mm ensuring zero [collateral
damage estimate] on any buildings, the opportunity was definitely there for us
to engage those two guys or even provide containment fires to try to slow their
movement” (p.1.).
These rules create an additional need to develop tactical
methodology to engage the enemy while decreasing troop exposure; UAS are just
such a method. Additionally, UAS strike
operations have the ability to follow rules of engagement without endangering a
soldier or airman’s life. According to
Dr. Stephen Carter, Yale Law School Professor, the current administration believes
that UAS are ideally suited to this in that they are highly accurate and able
to “discriminate perfectly” (Carter,
2013, video, 2:17 sec), an assertion he does not dispute.
Discrimination
The principal in the just
conduct in war that bears relevance in this review is that of discrimination. Discrimination as applied to war fighting is
simply the concept of target discrimination, in other words, who is a target
and who is not, some may look at this as discriminating between combatants and
non-combatants. (Moseley, n.d.). Whether one agrees or disagrees with this
concept is beyond the scope of this document however, the use of UAS for
precision strikes neatly satisfies the requirement of discrimination within the
concept of UAS strike operations.
Over the course of the Global
War on Terror (GWOT) some reports indicate that UAS have consistently killed
less non-combatant than their manned counterparts (Saletan, 2013). Over a period of six years, from 2006 through
2012, several agencies have calculated the percentage of civilian death as
opposed to al-Quaida and Taliban deaths in Pakistan as a result of UAS
strikes. Figures ranged from a low of
six percent to a high of 22 to 35 percent; compare this to the death rates of
civilians in previous conflicts, most directly comparable (due to the air strike
factor only with no ground troops in the calculations) the NATO bombing
campaign in Serbia, 83 percent (Saletan, 2013).
Although there are opposing viewpoints and exact figures are extremely
difficult to ascertain due to different methodologies, military and CIA secrecy
requirements, and the integrity or political agendas of the reporting agency,
research does support that UAS strikes are capable of inflicting less collateral
damage than MA strikes. Walsh, after
reviewing numerous data sources comes to the conclusion that civilian deaths
attributable to drone strikes are typically similar or in most accounts lower than
civilian deaths from other methods (Walsh, 2013).
Continued
development
UAS
development continues at a rapid pace with new UAS such as the shipboard
capable X-47, the ultra high altitude RQ-180, and the mach 6 capable SR-72 as
prime examples of cutting edge UAS development (Weinberger, 2014). Specifically related to precision strikes, improvements
in imaging systems will continue to improve the utility and accuracy of UAS in
strike roles. The ARGUS-IS 1.8 gigapixel
resolution imaging system designed for UAS operations is reportedly capable of
taking images as small as 15 centimeters from an altitude of 6 kilometers
(Military.com, 2013). This type of high-level
resolution enables decision makers and intelligence personnel to have greater
clarity of the action on the ground and be more accurate in assessments that
preface kill – no kill decisions.
The ability to operate long
endurance, strike capable UAS from aircraft carriers is another development
that will provide flexibility for battlefield commanders and strategic
planners. Eliminating the need to
operate from foreign soil via ship based air operations has long been a
successful strategy of the United States in the manned aircraft environment and
will likely be so in the unmanned environment.
One such aircraft currently under development that is designed to be
capable operating form an aircraft carrier is the X-47 (Weinberger, 2014).
Lastly, continued debate,
both nationally and internationally, on the rules of war and the lethal use of
UAS can serve only to heighten the populace’s level of awareness of the issue
and enable policy makers at all levels to determine policies and rules that, if
not satisfy, at least recognize the concerns of the citizenship.
References
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